

Tópicos de Microeconomía: Economía del Sector Público

Parte I: Teoría de los Bienes Públicos

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- V. Mecanismos para Alcanzar Eficiencia

A. Mecanismos de Revelación de Preferencias

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Parte II: Teoría de la Imposición

Prof. Diego Fernández Felices

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